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Religion and Conflict Resolution
Douglas M. Johnston *
In years past, the political-military aspects of international
relationships have been the dominant theme. More recently, the
term "national security" has been broadened to include consider-
ations as diverse as the environment and migration patterns. With
the breakdown of the old East-West confrontation, though, deep-
seated hostilities, which were previously suppressed under commu-
nist domination, have surfaced and are exerting an increasing
influence in national and international affairs. These problems are
peculiarly resistant to diplomatic compromise and it is becoming
clear that the old ways of doing business are no longer sufficient.
Military action is increasingly less acceptable as an answer. Instead,
a new approach is needed that focuses on interactions at the com-
munity level and that bridges differences through the emerging
discipline of conflict resolution.
As the twentieth century draws to a close, one is struck by the
degree to which the relative calm in the West of the last forty
years contrasts with the unprecedented brutality of ,the first fifty.
Clearly, the sobering constraints of nuclear deterrence represented
a major watershed in the relations of nations. Now a watershed of
a different sort is emerging; the composition of conflict itself is
changing.
With the decline of the East-West confrontation, few of the
conflicts that remain will have ideological roots. Instead, most will
derive from clashes of communal identity on the basis of race,
ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Such disputes tend to occur
either at the fault lines of rival nationalities or where there are
strains borne of economic competition and rising expectations.
These are the most intractable sources of conflict, and they are
the sources with which conventional diplomacy is least suited to
deal.
The classical tools of diplomacy typically include an exchange
of information, the often manipulative signaling of positions, and
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one or more forms of negotiation. Such measures are normally
quite suitable for dealing with conflicts that relate to tangible
material interests which are inherently divisible and for which it is
usually possible to forge some sort of compromise (such as territo-
rial expansion at the expense of a competing ideology). Nonmate-
rial "identity-based" conflicts, on the other hand, are often not
well understood by practical-minded diplomats accustomed to
operating in an East-West context of nation-state politics. What is
required is not a shrewd understanding of the interests of both
sides, but rather an understanding of the emotional stakes of the
parties and their respective interpretations of first principles such
as self-determination, justice, and freedom.
This challenge to diplomacy is heightened by the restrictions
that international organizations have placed upon themselves
against becoming involved in the internal conflicts of their mem-
ber states. Because of this vacuum and because of the changing
nature of conflict, there has been an observable expansion of the
role of religious figures and spiritually motivated lay persons in
the conduct of various forms of mediation and conflict resolution.
Such persons are often better equipped to reach people at the
individual and group levels --where inequities and insecurities are
most keenly felt-than are most political leaders who occupy the
corridors of power. They are also better attuned to dealing with
basic moral issues and to speaking to spiritual needs, at times
extending beyond the boundaries of their own faith traditions.
Among the more prominent spiritual leaders of our times are
those who have led significant nonviolent movements for political
and social change, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King,
Jr., Bishop Desmond Tutu, or the exiled Dalai Lama of Tibet.
There is, however, a growing core of spiritual actors at a different
level-those who are seeking to promote peace "from the middle."
Sometimes in the realm of public diplomacy or sometimes in the
anonymous, behind-the-scenes realm of unofficial diplomacy, these
third party interveners are making their mark in the world of
negotiation and conflict resolution. While the divisive character of
religious influences is widely appreciated and understood, their ob-
verse contributions to resolving conflict are all but totally un-
known.
Over the past two years, the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies in Washington, D.C., has been examining the ways
in which religious doctrine can be harnessed to build confidence
and trust. Toward this end, seven case situations from around the
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globe have been examined in which religious or spiritual interven-
tion has contributed to the successful prevention or resolution of
actual or incipient conflict. These include: (1) the leadership of
the Catholic Church in the peaceful transition to democracy in
the Philippines; (2) the role of the churches in the recent revolu-
tion in East Germany; (3) the contribution of Moravian Church
officials in resolving the conflict between the Sandanistas and the
East Coast Indians of Nicaragua; (4) the instrumental role of Mor-
al Rearmament, a global network of spiritually motivated people,
in reconciling differences between the Germans and the French fol-
lowing World War II; and (5) between blacks and whites thirty
years later in the peaceful transition to independence of Rhodesia;
(6) the role of the Quakers in promoting a conciliatory aftermath
to a bitter civil war in Nigeria, and finally; (7) the contribution of
the South African churches to the abolition of apartheid.
The Center's goal is to derive practical guidelines for practi-
tioners that will enable them to recognize and help facilitate situa-
tions where religious or spiritual factors can play a positive role in
promoting social change on a nonviolent basis. These practitioners
include foreign service officers, those working with religious orga-
nizations, or simply individuals operating on a personal basis.
In terms of future possibilities, there are at least four ongoing
conflicts where similar approaches are being attempted with vary-
ing degrees of success: Northern Ireland, Mozambique, Sri Lanka,
and the Punjab.
I. NORTHERN IRELAND
The history of the conflict in Northern Ireland is well-known.
While the social and cultural strife in this country finds its genesis
in the complex ethnicity produced by successive Celtic, Roman,
and later Saxon invasions, most view the conflict as a religious
confrontation between Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland,
however, is not the battleground for a classic religious war in
which one party seeks to force the conversion of its opponents.
Beneath the religious labels are communities professing rival na-
tional identities and political objectives.'
The attitudes and perceptions of both groups are shaped
by mutual distrust and suspicion. The Catholics want a united
I EDWARD MOXON-BROWNE, NATION, CLASS AND CREED IN NORTHERN IRELAND 3
(1983).
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state with the English out, while the Protestants fear being sub-
sumed by the Catholics in a united Ireland.2 In effect, these deep-
seated suspicions, fueled by a vicious cycle of violence, have be-
come self-fulfilling prophecies.
Despite its many attempts to do so, the British government
has been unable to present itself as an objective party in resolving
the conflict.3 As a result, many have turned to the churches and
church leaders as mediators and catalysts for negotiation. Indeed,
the clergy and lay church leaders have been active since 1968 in
their attempts to defuse the situation, with two initiatives in the
mid-1970s particularly standing out.
The "Feakle Initiative" of 1974, initiated by officers of the
Irish Council of Churches, brought representatives of Sinn Fein
(the reputed political arm of the IRA) in' contact with representa-
tives of the British government for negotiations. Among other
accomplishments, these negotiations resulted in a short-lived IRA
cease-fire lasting from Christmas of 1974 until Easter of 1975. 4
During this same time frame, a Leaders Peace Campaign was
initiated by official church leaders. This public campaign of news-
paper advertisements, rallies, and petitions, resulted in meetings
between church leaders and government officials from Ireland, the
United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland.5
Although these efforts soon broke down, throughout the
1980s and into the 1990s church leaders have persisted in their
attempts to bring the diverse parties together to build confidence
and provide a context for reconciliation in the face of ongoing
acts of violence. Even with the recently renewed violence of late
1991 and early 1992, unprecedented in intensity since the mid-
1970s, many church efforts continue apace. These range from pro-
viding relief services to public campaigns for peace and under-
standing, to interdenominational working groups to address the
various social ills confronting the citizenry.
The paradox remains that while religious persons and groups
continue to be active in promoting peace, objective analysts con-
sider religious institutions to be major contributors to the continu-
ing division in Northern Ireland.6 Although institutional church
2 John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Northern Ireland's Future: What is to be, CON-
FLICr Q., Summer 1990, at 147, 151.
3 Id. at 149-50.
4 LYBE SHIVERS & DAVID BOWMAN, MoRE THAN THE TROUBLES 142 (1984).
5 Id.
6 MOXON-BROWNE, supra note 1, at 3.
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leaders meet, issue statements against violence, and urge prayers
for peace, these same leaders are criticized for resisting peace
initiatives that would alter their own institutions, such as the for-
mation of ecumenical bodies that would involve both Catholics
and Protestants, integrated schooling, and mixed public housing.7
Northern Ireland is a unique microcosm for understanding
the role of religion either as a source of conflict or as a means
for resolving conflict. It is not a matter of "the church" standing
for something in opposition to society; the majority of the people
in Northern Ireland have an active connection with a church. As
in South Africa, the institutional churches represent their parishio-
ners and reflect many of the same divisions that plague society.
Thus, there is no simple separation of politics and religion in
society. Again, like South Africa, church initiatives that help break
down the psychological barriers will be a critical prerequisite to
breaking the political stalemate.
II. MOZAMBIQUE
In 1962, the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique ("FRELIMO")
was founded to free Mozambique. from Portuguese colonial rule.
After Portugal's withdrawal, FRELIMO became the natural power-
base from which an independent Mozambique was born. Within
six months of Mozambique's independence, however, the insur-
gent Resistencia de Nacional Mocambicana ("RENAMO") was formed
with the backing of South Africa ahd Rhodesia. By the late 1970s,
the increasingly radical orientation of the FRELIMO leadership led
to the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as the guiding ideology and
to the signing of twenty-year treaties with both Cuba and the Sovi-
et Union.' As this transpired, RENAMO shifted its headquarters
to the Transvaal, the South African province adjacent to Mozam-
bique. The civil war in .Mozambique has now cost over a million
lives and caused extensive destruction of property and infra-
structure.
The ascendence of Joaquim Chissano to the presidency in
1986, following the death of President Machel, has effectively mod-
erated FRELIMO's program. Unlike his predecessor, Chissano
believes that only negotiations can end Mozambique's plight. His
7 Interview with Duncan Morrow, Professor of Political Science, University of Ulster
at Jordanstown, in Belfast, Northern Ireland (May 18, 1992).
8 Witney W. Schneidman, Conflict Resolution in Mozambique: A Status Repor4 CSIS
AFRICA NoTES, February 28, 1991, at 1.
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strategy has been threefold: to counter RENAMO's military gains
through nonmilitary measures; to prepare his own constituency for
negotiations that will likely involve the making of concessions; and
to determine how a negotiation process can be structured that will
have adequate appeal to RENAMO.9
In 1990, both sides agreed to talks in Rome mediated by the
Santo Egidio Community, a Catholic lay organization associated
with the Vatican. The Catholic Church was a logical mediator
because both FRELIMO and RENAMO respect its influence and
motives.'0 Although both sides have now entered into negotia-
tions with the Church's help, the violence persists. In the fall of
1991, the Mozambican government and RENAMO signed an
agreement committing both sides to a cease-fire. Within days of
the agreement, however, RENAMO rebels had killed thirty people.
Despite these actions, Church leaders remain confident that they
can facilitate a negotiating process. The challenge ahead is to
convince both FRELIMO and RENAMO that they are not engaged
in a zero-sum struggle. The stature accorded the Catholic Church
by both sides will hopefully make that task less difficult.
III. SRI LANKA
For a number of years, the violence on the island of Sri Lan-
ka has resulted in a de facto separation of the island into two
regions. In the North, the Hindu Tamils, who make up only eigh-
teen percent of the population, are resisting the Buddhist
Sinhalas, who predominate throughout the country. Because the
Sinhala majority has characteristically excluded the Tamils from all
facets of Sri Lankan society, including the government, civil war
has raged between the Sinhalas and various Tamil rebel groups
since 1983. The largest and most powerful rebel group has been
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"). The rebels are
supported by the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, severely complicat-
ing Indian efforts to mediate an agreement.
In 1987, as the Sri Lankan military appeared to be gaining
the upper hand, the Indian government put considerable pressure
on Sri Lanka to accept an Indian-mediated peace agreement and
the establishment of an Indian peace-keeping force. The Indian
forces encountered stiff resistance from the Tamil rebels who
9 Id. at 2.
10 Id. at 7.
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refused to give up their armed struggle; by February of- 1988,
India had committed 50,000 troops to the peace-keeping opera-
tion. In August of 1989, as Indian casualties mounted and domes-
tic political support waned, India and Sri Lanka agreed to a with-
drawal of Indian forces by the end of March, 1990. The with-
drawal was completed on schedule, but violence between the Tam-
ils and Sinhalas continues.
A religious group,, which shall remain nameless, has been
attempting to mediate the conflict." It has injected itself Where
official efforts at diplomacy have failed. Serving largely as message
carriers, the group has had some success in bridging the gap be-
tween the two sides. The group itself has credibility with both
sides because its only motive is to quell the violence.
The situation has grown even more complex with the recent
formation of a new Sinhalese marxist insurgency. Nevertheless, the
religious interveners continue to convey messages back and forth
across the lines in their ongoing effort to facilitate negotiation.
The mediators stress, however, that they themselves do not have
the wherewithal to influence a settlement. The parties alone can
achieve peace.
IV. THE PUNJAB
The ethnic and sectarian strife that predominates throughout
Indian society is highlighted by the conflict between the Sikhs and
the Hindus in the northern province of Punjab. Through the
years, a Sikh separatist movement has attempted to establish an
independent state in the Punjab. The central government, domi-
nated by Hindus of the National Congress Party, believes that
India, an unnatural conglomeration of ethnic groups speaking a
myriad of languages, will quickly unravel if it grants the Punjab
independence.
2
The situation in the Punjab took an interesting turn with the
involvement of a Jain monk called Guruji ("enlightened spiritual
guide on the path of self-realization"), who is dedicated to nonvio-
lence. He toured the areas of the Punjab hardest hit by the vio-
lence in 1986, and in the spring of 1987, issued an appeal for
peace in the region. In this appeal, Guruji called on the various
11 The nature of the group's activities requires that its identity remain confidential.
12 James C. Clad, India: Crisis and Transition, WASH. Q., Winter 1992, at 91, 93-94.
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Sikh leaders as well as Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi to end the
violence.
Guruji's mediation efforts were well received. In May of 1987,
he initiated a gathering in the Golden Temple at Amritsar, a holy
site claimed by both Hindus and Sikhs, which has been occupied
by Sikh militants. At Amritsar, Guruji met with the head priest,
Darshan Singh Ragi, and other Sikh leaders to create an atmo-
sphere of peace and facilitate dialogue between the Sikhs and the
central government.
These talks resulted in the formulation of a four-point plan
involving: (1) the release of innocent prisoners from both sides;
(2) the rehabilitation of army deserters; (3) a permanent with-
drawal of the Central Reserve Police Force which had been de-
ployed around the Golden Temple since 1984; and (4) the dis-
missal of all court cases against underground youths. Unfortunate-
ly, the Punjab government sabotaged the burgeoning peace pro-
cess, fearing a loss of prestige if religious leaders succeeded where
it had failed.
Guruji's peace initiative in the Punjab reflects the possibility
of having an honest dialogue between people with strongly differ-
ing opinions and world views. His accomplishment is extraordi-
nary: An avowed apostle of nonviolence met with terrorists and
engaged them in dialogue with the central government, which
heretofore had refused to talk. The final word on the issue has
not yet been spoken, and sadly, violence continues unabated. But
the full potential of this monk's belief in nonviolence and his
perseverance in pursuing dialogue has yet to be felt.
V. CONCLUSION
Marshalling the resources of the world's religions in the man-
agement of tension is an ambitious undertaking. It does not, how-
ever, call for some artful synthesizing of the discrete faiths of
humankind-which would be both impossible and ill-advised. Rath-
er, it calls for rigorous analysis and exploitation of the points at
which the religious underpinnings for conflict resolution intersect.
It also suggests a need to strengthen the "universal" aspects of the
different religions, while at the same time preserving those specific
rites and symbols without which religion cannot meet the needs of
the human condition.
As one looks through the 1990s and beyond, the challenges
are likely to prove even more formidable than they have in the
past. If the goal of achieving peace in meaningful terms is to
[Vol. 67:1433
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prove any less elusive, far greater attention will have to be paid to
the spiritual dimension of international politics.

